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Managing budget cuts in Edinburgh’s sport and recreation services: Progressive 
localism in a resilient local authority? 
While the Westminster government’s class-driven austerity is UK-wide, Scottish 
social democracy influences how it is conceptualised and resisted (Mooney, 2013).  
The Scottish Parliament’s limited devolved powers and a  broken system of local 
government funding - with roots in both Scottish and Westminster Governments - 
leaves little room for challenging austerity.  Responding to increased demand for 
services and financial constraints Edinburgh Council’s ‘transformation programme’ 
sought a leaner, agile council to promote community resilience.  As a discretionary 
service, protected by a weak legislative requirement, sport received significant cuts.  
Using interviews with policy actors this paper contends that, by embracing the 
conservative concept of resilience over the more critical concept of resourcefulness 
(MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013), the council’s management of cuts revolved around 
financial savings and income generation not socially just progressive localism 
(Featherstone et al, 2012).  The leisure trust’s success in managing cuts encouraged 
more, mirroring John’s (2014) argument that, in resilient councils, councillors think 
the ‘outer organisation’ can be diminished without damaging the core.  This 
accelerated neoliberal processes pre-dating austerity.  Apparent progressive localism 
from asset transfers downplays how, driven by financial savings, this empowered 
some middle class individuals while deflecting attention from the state’s withdrawal 
from promoting social justice.  A campaign to save a leisure pool in a deprived area 
saw arguments for an ethical ‘play’ space to support community resilience.  However, 
within neoliberalism’s ‘cracks and fissures’ (Crisp, 2015) protestors encouraged 
council support for community management - later rescinded amidst much acrimony - 
for a facility they could never run progressively.   
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Introduction 
O’Hara (2014, p.5) argues that ‘Well-framed, well-crafted and often repeated, the 
austerity story is the dominant political narrative in Britain today’.  While the 2008 
financial crash was supposed to herald the death of the UK’s neoliberal experiment 
Jones (2014) argues that neoliberal ‘outriders’ redefined the crisis to one of state 
excess requiring massive cuts to public services.  In response to the crisis of the 
finance-orientated accumulation regime we have experienced what Jessop (2015) 
terms ‘Thatcherism redux’ through the ‘reassemblement of economic and political 
forces to defend neoliberalism and roll it out again’ (p.19). Highlighting the key 
parameters of a hegemonic project that forged contemporary society (Jones, 2011) is 
problematic because neoliberalism is a ‘slippery concept’ discussed more by critics 
than supporters (Jessop, 2013).  While mostly associated in the UK with the Thatcher 
Governments of the 1980s the embrace of monetarist policies by a Labour 
Government in the 1970s gave the concept momentum (Worth & Abbott, 2006).  The 
collapse of the post-war economic settlement with its central tenets of Keynesian full 
employment and social democratic welfare state was persuasively explained by New 
Right politicians, think tanks and newspapers as a crisis of government overload and 
ungovernability (Hay, 2004).  As the aforementioned author argues this initial 
normative neoliberalism has evolved into a normalized and necessitarian 
neoliberalism based around belief in: market mechanisms, privatisation and 
deregulation; free trade and movement of capital; a limited role for the state; welfare 
reform and labour market flexibility; and low personal and corporate taxation that 
dominates British politics. 
 
Much of neoliberalism’s strength stems from its depoliticised portrayal as a simple 
and inevitable response to the crisis of an over-extended state and the new realities of 
the global economy (Hay, 2004).  In a provocatively titled article ‘Margaret Thatcher 
and Thatcherism: Dead but not Buried’ Jessop (2015) argues that, under the guise of 
‘Third Way’ ‘flanking and support mechanisms’ (p.20) the post 1997 New Labour 
Governments deepened neoliberalism through its modernization agenda and support 
for financialization and globalization.  While the 2008 financial crisis was blamed on 
New Labour’s fiscal profligacy its origins lay in what the aforementioned author 
terms ‘cumulating pathologies’ that developed over the previous forty years.  During 
this time the stress on personal responsibility, poverty of aspiration and individual 
enterprising subjects tried to stop people thinking about class and collective action 
while, to justify widening levels of societal inequality, there was a concerted attempt 
among some politicians and media outlets to denigrate those at the bottom of the class 
hierarchy and glorify those at the top (Jones, 2011).   
 
King (2013, p.228) argues that, with severe cuts to council sport services in England, 
their ability to ‘make a difference’ locally may be compromised by policy failings or 
the limits of the welfare state in this field (Coalter, 1998).  He believes that the hostile 
political and financial context may necessitate ‘significant adaptation and innovation 
within emerging organisational service models to ensure viable…Sport for All 
policies’ (p.17).  This paper extends analysis of austerity’s impact on English sport 
services by examining its impact in Edinburgh: a city often ignored in critical urban 
scholarship owing to its image of wealth and professionalism (Kallin & Slater, 2014).  
Since 1998 a charitable trust (Edinburgh Leisure) has managed over thirty sport and 
leisure facilities on behalf of the council.  The self-styled ‘biggest club in town’ also 
runs programmes in stroke rehabilitation, cancer support, falls prevention, childhood 
obesity and mental health improvement.  Its aim of ‘balancing the heart and the 
pound’ through social enterprise status is controversial, with some arguing that its 
links to the council undermines the independent spirit and attitudes found in genuine 
social enterprises.  The need to plug a £67 million funding gap by 2017/18 saw 
Edinburgh Council initiate a transformative agenda for leaner and agile council 
services to build more resilient communities.  This new delivery model would: deliver 
services ‘with people not to or for them’; devolve decision-making to local teams; 
empower front-line staff to enhance outcomes for citizens; promote partnership 
working to streamline services; and obtain extensive efficiencies and financial savings 
(Edinburgh Council, 2015).  To aid analysis of the empirical work, the paper begins 
by outlining the political and financial context facing Scottish councils since the 
Scottish Parliament’s inception in 1999.  
 
Devolution stemmed from a democratic deficit emanating from Scots rejecting 
Thatcherite neoliberalism but, because of UK voting patterns, were governed by 
Conservative Westminster Governments.  The election, in 1997, of a New Labour 
Government at Westminster with a policy commitment to Scottish home rule would, 
after a referendum in that year, lead to the formal opening of the Scottish Parliament 
in 1999.  Devolution saw the Scottish Parliament given responsibility for local 
government, health, housing, education, tourism, transport, sport and the arts, while 
‘higher order’ powers such as the economy, defence, constitution, foreign policy, 
benefits and social security were reserved to Westminster.  Scotland is thus a sub 
system of the UK state with the latter’s legitimacy stemming, in part, from 
successfully managing Scottish calls for independence (Cairney & McGarvey, 2013). 
 
The Parliament receives a block grant determined by the Westminster Government 
and this, combined with its absence of significant tax raising and borrowing powers 
creates a fiscal irresponsibility (Mitchell, 2010).  As Thompson et al (2008) argue, 
having total control over spending decisions but extremely limited ability to raise 
required revenue undermines the autonomy and accountability of the Parliament and 
Government.  Politicians have limited incentives to introduce innovative ideas to 
enhance the economy – as increased tax revenues goes to the Westminster Chancellor 
not the Scottish Government - or public services as the block grant will always 
appear.  The Scottish Parliament has thus had a structural failure from the start as ’it 
spends but it does not tax’ (Maclean, 2014) with the fiscal irresponsibility detrimental 
to the Parliament and political parties as it encourages politicians to compete with 
each other over spending promises as they realise that responsibility for obtaining the 
tax revenue lies elsewhere (Thompson et al, 2008).   
 
Only two small property taxes are determined in Scotland: the Council Tax, which is 
a tax on domestic property, and Non Domestic Rates, which is a tax on business 
property.  These provide less than 10% of the Parliament’s spending budget with the 
remaining money coming from Westminster’s block grant (Eiser, 2017).  The SNP 
Government’s policy commitment to freeze Council Tax further increases the reliance 
on Westminster’s block grant (Maclean, 2014).  The Calman Commission (2009) 
sought to limit the Scottish Parliament’s fiscal irresponsibility by successfully arguing 
for a partial devolution of income tax, stamp duty and landfill tax.  The Smith 
Commission (2014) also advocated further tax decentralisation to make the Scottish 
Parliament ‘more accountable and responsible for the effects of policy decisions and 
their resulting benefits or costs’.  It remains to be seen whether the devolution of 
income tax rates and bands, air passenger duty, and half of Value Added Tax (VAT) 
revenues – together with £2.5 billion of predominantly disability benefits – challenges 
the fiscal ‘fantasy land’ of Scottish politics (Maclean, 2014).     
 
To supporters the Parliament’s proportional representation voting system would 
deliver a ‘new politics’ of consensual democracy in opposition to the adversarial 
Westminster system (Cairney & Widfeldt, 2015).  The voting system made minority 
or coalition governments likely, witnessed in coalitions between Labour and Liberal 
Democrats (1999-2003, 2003-2007), and a minority SNP Government (2007-2011) 
which positioned itself as austerity opponents and defenders of social democracy 
through opposing means testing and marketisation of services (Cairney & Widfeldt, 
2015).   In the 2011 Scottish elections the SNP became the first majority government, 
with success continuing in the 2015 UK General Election where it won 56 of 59 
Scottish seats, leading the First Minister to state that ‘people have voted 
overwhelmingly for…an end to austerity’.  While the SNP’s success seems 
remarkable, given that a year earlier Scots voted against becoming an independent 
country by 55% to 45%, they were helped by Labour joining forces with the 
Conservatives in the ‘Better Together’ campaign which ‘contaminated’ their brand 
(Johns & Mitchell, 2016).  In the 2016 Scottish election the SNP were the largest 
party but fell two seats short of a majority.  In the 2016 EU Referendum, Britain voted 
to leave the EU but Scotland voted 62% to 38% to remain.  In the 2017 UK Election 
the SNP remained the largest party, but won only 35 of their 56 seats.   
 
Supporters of ‘new politics’ felt that a strengthened parliament and greater public 
participation could deliver fundamental societal change (Cairney, 2015) and ‘Scottish 
solutions to Scottish problems’ - although what this meant was never clearly 
articulated (Mitchell, 2011).  However, widening inequality and social class enables 
and discourages people’s life chances (Bell et al, 2014), showing such ambitions 
remain unrealised.  While those on the political left in England often perceive 
Scotland as a social democratic ‘land of milk and honey’ (Mooney & Poole, 2004) – 
with its free personal care for the elderly and abolition of university tuition fees - the 
reality is very different.  To some, ‘new politics’ rhetoric deflected from the middle 
classes’ domination of public discourse (Davidson et al, 2010; Riddoch, 2015b) and 
the influence of professional elites that marked a return to a form of governance 
prevalent in 1950s Scotland (Paterson, 2009).  This is maintained by the Scots’ 
indifference to ‘who has power and voice’ and a ‘preference for a sentimentalised and 
romanticised story of themselves as radical while hidebound to deference, authority 
and elites’ (Hassan & Ilett, 2011, p.16).  As the aforementioned authors argue 
‘Scotland’s social democratic story works for the political and professional elites who 
run it’ (p.19).  As part of the British state Scotland has been fully integrated with the 
dominant neoliberalism, with local politicians and state managers ‘far from resistant 
to the new dispensation’ (Davidson et al, 2010). 
 
While progressive policies could be financed before the financial crash, Westminster 
austerity measures cannot be mitigated by the Scottish Parliament which cannot raise 
sufficient funds via taxation (Mitchell, 2011). As the aforementioned author argues, 
devolution architects paid insufficient attention to powers needed for effective self-
government, with the main powers for redistributing wealth reserved to Westminster.  
When support for a ‘Yes’ vote grew during the independence referendum, political 
parties supporting the union made a ‘vow’ to grant more powers to the Parliament if 
there was a ‘No’ vote.   The subsequent Smith Commission and Scotland Act 2016 
saw the Parliament given power to set income tax rates and bands, but control over 
National Insurance, wealth taxes, corporate taxes, VAT and excise duties remained 
reserved.  Devolving one tax power is a ‘political poisoned chalice’ as, if used, the 
SNP seek funds from middle and lower income earners not large corporations or the 
wealthy (McWhirter, 2017).  There is a ‘neoliberal bias’ in pushing desires for 
improved public services onto ordinary earners, shifting Scottish politics right-ward 
and ‘encouraging voters to believe that the social democratic future they seek is 
beyond their reach’ (Mcmillan, 2015a).  The new powers do not counter ‘a failed 
consensus of top down austerity’ by constraining the Scottish Government within UK 
austerity proposals (Mcmillan, 2014 & 2015b).  
    
While struggles between the Scottish Parliament and Westminster are key for 
understanding austerity, so are relations between the former and local councils 
(Riddoch, 2015a).  Some see a consensual and co-operative ‘Scottish approach’ to 
policy making in the Government’s National Performance Framework, which sets 
national outcomes then trusts Scotland’s 32 councils to deliver them through Single 
Outcome Agreements agreed between Community Planning Partnerships and 
Government (Cairney, 2015).  The 2007 Concordat between the Government and the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) saw the former limiting their 
ring-fencing of council funding and reducing central monitoring of councils if they 
agreed to deliver the Government’s strategic goals of a council tax freeze, reduced 
school class sizes, and recruiting more police officers (Cairney & McGarvey, 2013).  
However, as Cairney (2015) remarks, with an over-stretched committee system the 
Parliament lacks information on ‘what is going on locally’ with ‘few people paying 
attention to this gap’ in democratic accountability.   
 
Riddoch (2015a & b) argues that the Government’s localism goals are undermined by 
remote ‘supersize’ councils whose average population is 163,000, compared with a 
European average of 20,000.  Government control of over 80% of finance for council 
spending (Cairney & McGarvey, 2013) leads some to describe local government as 
predominantly ‘an administrative unit of national government, not a democratic unit 
in its own right’ (McAteer, 2014, p.9).  The centralisation within Scottish politics 
undermines councils’ financial autonomy and status – encouraging some of the lowest 
local election turnouts in Europe -  and, with the reluctant implementation of austerity 
at national government level, means the struggle for a ‘resilient, progressive and 
democratic politics for the 21st Century’ must begin at grassroots (Mcmillan, 2015c).  
The Commission on Strengthening Local Democracy highlighted this ‘enduring blind 
spot’ in Scottish politics (Riddoch, 2015a, p.205) when stating ‘Big government and 
big local government have struggled to improve the pattern of outcomes and 
inequalities because they occur at a very granular, local community level’.  Large 
councils means those making decisions are, to locals, ‘generally strangers’ (Riddoch, 
2015a, p.210) with distance accentuated by professionals’ detachment and their fear 
of change (Riddoch, 2015b).  While the Community Empowerment Act may allow 
some progressive community groups to fill the ‘local’ gap, it mainly creates a ‘chance 
for burnt out volunteers to engage in yet more unequal struggles with legal 
departments of over-sized councils so their…leisure centres and other important 
social functions can be saved from impending cuts’ (Riddoch, 2015b, p.79).  As the 
aforementioned author remarks, the above context encourages ‘sticking plaster 
solutions’ rather than structural changes that could empower ‘the bystanding majority’ 
(p.122).                
 
Austerity policies from Westminster reach the Scottish Government via the Barnett 
formula which gives a population share of UK spending cuts to Scotland.  Scottish 
Government policy provided some protection for council budgets as, between 2009-
13, overall expenditure reduced by 11% compared with 13.5% in England, while 
expenditure (excluding education and policy) dropped by 13.4% compared with 
20.4% in England (Bailey et al, 2015; Hastings et al, 2013).  However, Scottish 
councils are ‘one of the key casualties of austerity’ whose management of cuts will 
significantly impact on disadvantaged individuals and places (Hastings et al, 2013).   
 
Theorising Austerity 
Levitas (2012) describes austerity as a ‘neoliberal shock doctrine providing an excuse 
for further appropriation of social resources by the rich’ (p.4).  While her critique of 
the accompanying Big Society concept applies largely to England, similar tensions 
exist within Scotland’s Community Empowerment agenda which seeks to develop 
community empowerment through ‘the energy of local people to come up with 
creative and successful solutions to local challenges’ (Scottish Government, 2012, 
p.6).   
 
Featherstone et al (2012) see the Westminster government’s positivity around 
localism and community – rooted in its Big Society rhetoric - as central to 
neoliberalism by filling the gap left by ‘the privileging of market rationalities over 
social needs’ (p.178). The ability of entrepreneurial and socially responsible 
volunteers to replace state withdrawal forms part of a wider programme - deemed 
austerity localism - where government ‘has constructed the local as antagonistic to the 
state and invoked it to restructure the public sector’ and further ‘roll back’ 
neoliberalism (Featherstone et al, 2012, p.178).  However, in this narrative 
communities are ‘under-theorised and misrepresented by dated Burkean notions of 
little platoons’, downplaying their transitory nature, divisions, and conflict (Gibson, 
2015).  Without acknowledging power imbalances and inequalities within and 
between communities risks the empowered being middle class individuals ‘with the 
resources, expertise and social capital to become involved in the provision of 
services’ thereby accentuating inequalities (Featherstone et al, 2012, p.179).  As 
Findlay-King et al (2017, p.2) argue, volunteers cannot counter hegemonic relations 
within the Big Society, like the need for austerity and inequality, as they ‘fill gaps not 
develop new vehicles for democracy’.   
  
To oppose austerity localism, Featherstone et al (2012) outline features of a 
progressive localism that thinks critically about how localism is ‘articulated, 
generated, mobilised and envisioned’ (p.179). Community strategies are progressive 
when they are outward looking, develop positive links between places and social 
groups, and extensive geographically.  They facilitate social justice, participation and 
tolerance and ‘feed into broader social and political movements that aim to transform 
national and international policy frameworks, thereby reversing the neoliberalisation 
of inter- and extra-local relations’ (p.180).  Williams et al (2014) believe that third 
sector organisations may counter neoliberalism by offering ‘spaces of hope’ and ‘sites 
of resistance’ that ‘prefigure alternative political and ethical worlds’ (p.2800).  
Acknowledging ‘cracks and fissures’ within neoliberalism (Crisp, 2015) produces 
optimistic readings of local ‘responsibilisation’ which can be ‘innovative and creative 
even radical’ through ‘negotiation of interests’ (Hall & McGarrol, 2013, p.691) 
between ‘different microworlds who find themselves on the same proximate turf’ 
(Amin, 2004, p.37).  Within Levitas’s (2012) twin interpretations of austerity it 
reflects, not a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ – where cuts fall on discretionary services 
with the potential for delivering preventative approaches (Asenova et al, 2015) - but a 
‘hermeneutics of faith’ where place based political struggles, debate and creative 
solutions shape localism and reinterpret communities as progressive (Hall & 
McGarrol, 2013).        
 
Linked to the above is the concept of the resilient local authority.  Promoting 
resilience is attractive to councils trying to help neighbourhoods negotiate 
socioeconomic challenges through transformative attempts at delivering ‘more for 
less’ (Asenova et al, 2015) within existing powers (Shaw, 2012).  With capacity for 
managing cuts through efficiencies declining, councils have reduced their role in 
some services, concentrated on the most disadvantaged, and encouraged local 
responsibility for local quality of life (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2016).  As the 
aforementioned remark, councils ‘support efforts to act creatively and reinvent 
institutional repertoires in a bid, not merely to implement austerity, but buffer local 
people and places against the shocks and disruptions associated with austerity’ 
(p.763).  Originating in an ecological context, resilience describes councils’ ability to 
not only recover from shocks (bounce back), but adjust to changes and bounce 
forward (John, 2014).  Building space for communities to create their own resilience – 
what Kennett et al (2015) term the ‘great risk shift’ - helps them adapt to a 
socioeconomic and political reality discouraging comprehensive public services and 
social security (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2012).  Shaw (2012) uses the concept to 
appreciate how councils successfully managed austerity through innovation, 
managing risk, strategic leadership and increasing civil society’s role.  He believes 
English councils were resilient to austerity as their centralised structure provided an 
‘organisational capacity and pragmatic sensibility to survive in trying circumstances’ 
(p.290).  However this may not be maintained ‘in those services that lie beyond the 
devolution limelight’ (Lowndes & Gardner, 2016, p.3).  The aforementioned authors 
believe the success of the austerity discourse stems from its ‘selective targeting on 
services without powerful institutional champions’ (p.4).  This creates a ‘distinctive 
geography of austerity’ with the impact of cuts influenced by levels of earlier cuts and 
localities’ ability to generate income and access forms of resilience like assets or 
reserves. 
 
The limits of resilience within the ‘smarter state’ relate to efficiency savings that 
cannot be replicated, transformative programmes lacking robust evaluation (NAO, 
2014), and loss of expertise stifling innovation (Lowndes & Gardner, 2016).  
Fitzgerald & Lupton (2015, p.598) believe positivity surrounding resilience ignores 
‘the important question of the remaining capacity for continued provision of local 
government services to residents’.  While community responsibilisation is viewed 
positively by some, as local knowledge connects with marginalised groups, others see 
it as ‘intensely localised and place specific, dependent on local advantages, historical 
assets and resources’ (Lowndes & Gardner, 2016, p.368).  The responsibilisation of 
risk from state to community is ‘shaped by austerity’, with vulnerable people not 
enabled to manage these changes which are themselves risk creators (McKendrick et 
al, 2016, p.16).  The aforementioned authors describe a lack of thought towards such 
challenges and ‘of the ‘effectiveness of what is being dismantled’ (p.17).  
 
A fundamental problem with resilience is, having academic roots in ‘apolitical 
ecology’ and psychology, it produces conservative readings of social relations 
(MacKinnon & Derickson, 2012).  The need for individuals, places and organisations 
to be resilient stems from its ideological fit with neoliberalism (Walker & Cooper, 
2011), ignoring the need to change the social system that causes local problems then 
blames communities for their predicament (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2016).  
Community self-organisation, through embracing the ‘nebulous but tremendously 
evocative concept’ of community, provides ‘a positive glow’ and ‘discourse of 
equivalence between people that ignore class, race and gender differences and mask 
inequality and hierarchy’ (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2012, p.259).  Advocating 
resilience amongst low income communities is deemed ‘particularly dangerous’ as it 
‘normalises the uneven effects of neoliberal governance’ (p.263).  To promote 
progressive and socially just relations MacKinnon & Derickson (2012) advocate the 
concept of resourcefulness which focuses on the role of the state and politics and 
‘need to problematize social relations and structures rather than take them for granted’ 
(p.254).      
 
 
 
Methods 
This research examines one Scottish council (Edinburgh) to extend studies 
investigating English sport services and austerity.  The research used an interpretivist 
paradigm to explore how actors made sense of their social worlds (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Neuman, 2000), with a case study approach chosen for its ability to 
examine contemporary issues within a real life context (Yin, 2003). Data collection 
began in May 2016 and ended September 2016.  This involved semi-structured 
interviews with four sport officials and two councillors centrally involved in taking 
budget decisions and implementing them.  Interviews lasted approximately one hour 
at a time and place convenient to interviewees.  They were recorded and transcribed 
with data analysis involving repeated reading of transcriptions - with austerity 
literature in mind - to identify patterns, similarities and differences (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994; Mason, 1996; Marvasti, 2004).  It used a recursive and iterative 
approach where data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously, each informing 
the other (Blaikie, 2000; Bryman, 2001).  Questions revolved around: how cuts were 
managed; how savings were made and income generated; thoughts towards asset 
transfers; and local protests. The study’s inductive and exploratory approach used a 
triangulation of methods by supplementing interviews with analysis of: council 
committee minutes; 63 blogs from a campaign group initiated to save a leisure pool 
(accessible at http://splashbackedinburgh.blogspot.co.uk/); and eighteen articles on 
this issue from local newspapers.  These were analysed via discourse analysis guided 
by the above theoretical discussion.  
 
Case Study  
As a result of the council’s financial situation Edinburgh Leisure’s budget was 
reduced by £334k in 2017 and by £407k in 2018.  This followed council approval for 
£85 million savings which created warnings that its public services were in crisis. The 
leader of the Labour / SNP administration challenged the Scottish Government to 
mend the broken council funding system and give them greater autonomy and control 
over revenue as, without this, they were forced into unpalatable decisions ‘driven by 
deliberate choices…in Westminster and Holyrood’. However, opposition councillors 
blamed the administration, with Conservatives criticising their failure to restructure 
the council and encourage efficiencies, and the Greens for ‘hiding behind the threat of 
government penalties’ rather than stand up for decent services’ (Holden, 2016).  The 
cuts led to warnings of eight sport centres closing by 2016/17, with Edinburgh 
Leisure’s Chairman believing it could mean ‘withdrawal from multiple venues and 
services’.  An SNP councillor defended the cuts stating that Edinburgh Leisure 
delivered a £1 million turnaround in its finances, with council funding accounting for 
only 30% of this, compared with 60% in 1998. He disparaged ‘scare stories’ with the 
£1 million ‘change around’ giving the trust the efficiency to address cuts (Swanson, 
2016).  However Edinburgh Leisure’s success made it easier for councillors to cut 
their budget and some felt that bad news from the trust might force councillors to 
revisit cuts.  One councillor highlighted how the trust’s Social Return on Investment 
(SROI) success - delivering £8 of community benefit for every £1 invested - was met 
with a budget cut.  He feared that councillors would ‘chip away’ at the trust’s budget 
until it is unsustainable. 
 
While price increases were kept close to inflation the trust’s prices are among 
Scotland’s highest (Audit Scotland, 2009).  It was appreciated that, unlike other 
services operating as sole providers, sport faced competition from 24 hour gyms and 
cuts and price increases reduced competitiveness.  Asenova et al (2015) see austerity 
localism when cuts fall on discretionary services with the potential to deliver 
preventative spend.  Shifting the focus from austerity to structures, interviewees 
stressed that the fundamental problem was sport’s discretionary status and weak 
legislative requirement for ‘adequate’ provision.  Despite the Christie Commission’s 
call for preventative approaches (Christie, 2011) that might promote community 
resilience, such discussions were not occurring because the focus was on, as one 
interviewee commented, ‘short term savings, internal bickering, daily trivia and 
addressing the needs of those who shout loudest’.  He also felt they were undermined 
by NHS funding pressures and councils’ short electoral cycles.  One interviewee 
argued that ‘cuts changed the council zeitgeist to be more about numbers and, for 
touchy-feely things, there’s a licence to neglect as we’ve got to save £500k’. 
 
Relocating the small sport section to the large Children and Families department – 
effectively Education - meant it was that aspect of a large budget that could be cut.  It 
was previously within a large Culture & Leisure department, from which it drew 
strength, then within Culture and Sport – which technically was not a department – 
and now marginalised with ‘a chunk of work given to Children & Families like they 
might give street cleaning’.  There was concern that moving departments meant things 
like club development would ‘fall off the table as we lack resources to keep 
everything going’. While it was believed that the public were unaware of cuts – given 
the focus on back office savings in larger facilities, management delayering, and 
shifting offices to save money - their cumulative impact was biting.  The concern that 
a positive emphasis on resilience within transformative agendas ignores how the loss 
of expertise might undermine future innovations (Lowndes & Gardner, 2016) was 
evident.  The loss of one sport official in the delayering was felt to threaten their 
pioneering work in physical activity and health.  One interviewee commented ‘the 
council is kidding itself we can get leaner and smarter and hey presto no impact on 
services but we’ll cut the budget by half…that won’t work’.    
     
Cost savings involved Edinburgh Leisure taking over after school management of 
school sport facilities.  It was felt their expertise would deliver £500k efficiency 
savings and an additional £1 million income, while providing pupils with a pathway 
into sport and physical activity by familiarising them with the brand.  The move was 
not entirely supported by Education who were reluctant to lose control and had some 
scepticism about Edinburgh Leisure.  The change provoked protest from a 
commercial swimming lesson provider who argued that, despite assurances of 
compromise from a ‘co-operative council advocating a mixed economy of leisure’, 
they were ‘bullied into moving our lets to unsuitable venues. How does a small 
company have a chance against the might of the Council and Edinburgh Leisure’.  
Interviewees had little sympathy for this as, while appreciating why headteachers 
allowed clubs into their facilities at minimal or no cost, as one stated ‘that’s fine when 
money’s sloshing around but we’re in a different environment now’ and they could 
not allow ‘a private organisation to make money at taxpayer’s expense’  As another 
interviewee argued, ‘if anyone’s making money out of swimming lessons it will be 
Edinburgh Leisure because, as a non-profit organisation, it goes back into the 
business’.  Concern was expressed however that, having transferred one sport facility 
to volunteers, its ability to offer progressive localism could be undermined by the trust 
managing school sport facilities next door, which threatened its customer base.          
 
One interviewee felt that operating within a trust meant they were ‘at the end of a long 
piece of string’ from Westminster to Holyrood to the council meaning we’re 
somewhat insulated from cuts’.  He felt initial fears had not materialised as, since 
1998, the trust experienced on-going cuts – with its budget declining from £14 million 
to £8.5 million - and thus, while fearing the worst, there had been minimal change.  
However, this ‘minimal change’ was from a situation of on-going cuts.  Ten years ago 
the trust’s chair – the sport policy expert Professor Fred Coalter -  resigned over a lack 
of council funding and allocation of £500k to rescue Leith Waterworld that was losing 
£1500 daily (Swanson, 2005).  Mirroring Houlihan & Lindsey’s (2009) point about 
power imbalances within sport development partnerships, he argued the relationship 
was not an equal one. There was an acknowledgement that councils had ‘kicked the 
can down the road’ and delayed the cuts.  An advantage sport had over other services 
was that, as one interviewee commented, ‘we have the tills’ and could offset cuts 
through income generation.  This involved facility cafes now run in-house not 
franchised and more advertising in facilities. 
 
One urban policy analyst asked whether property company adverts at the Royal 
Commonwealth Pool constituted ‘creeping privatisation of public space’ (Matthews, 
2015).  His response chimed with the council leader who believed the fundamental 
problem was a broken system of local government finance, with the Government’s 
council tax freeze and councils’ inability to raise taxes locally preventing them raising 
money for decent services (Burns, 2016).  This mirrors Cox’s (2010) argument that 
‘genuine localism’ cannot exist with a council tax freeze and the inability of councils 
to increase local taxation as required.  One interviewee argued that, while preferring 
facility walls covered with health promotion messages, adverts provided useful 
income and they should concentrate on maintaining their progressive social 
programmes.  Council funding for these was stopped but staff obtained NHS money 
for their continuation.  While agreeing with King (2014) that health is a potential 
lifeline for sports development, there was concern about what would happen when 
this money ended, with external funding pressurising staff to obtain and evaluate it to 
ensure continuation.   
 
The focus on income generation significantly influenced sports development as, with 
facility closures ‘the last thing on councillors’ minds’, income generating sports like 
swimming, gymnastics and tennis were prioritised, with sport development posts for 
basketball, volleyball and athletics ‘quietly dropped’.  Some interviewees questioned 
whether provision constituted ‘sports development’, with the emphasis less on 
developing sport and more on getting clubs into venues for revenue.  However, such 
processes pre-dated austerity when, as one interviewee commented, ‘Edinburgh 
Leisure started getting a sense of its place in the world and they realised they had to 
be more about income generation because they have a board to report to and budget 
targets they’re legally required to make…it’s been a gradual process but now it’s a 
different ball game’.  The above chimes with a recent report criticising how trusts had 
become income generating vehicles for cash-strapped councils (McLeish, 2015).  
 
The above discussion highlights how the management of cuts was driven by financial 
savings and income generation (i.e. austerity localism), not socially just progressive 
localism (Featherstone et al, 2012).  These processes pre-dated austerity and had 
structural roots, but were now being accelerated with concerns expressed that 
decision-makers had little appreciation of the social consequences of cuts to sport 
services.    
 
Interviewees felt that cuts encouraged innovations that chimed with progressive 
localism, notably the asset transfer of two sports facilities to local volunteers.  While 
community responsibilisation is central to resilience as it links citizens to their own 
risk management (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2012), interviewees believed it was no 
panacea because it would reach, as one remarked, ‘affluent retired professionals in 
leafy neighbourhoods with the time and skills to run facilities, not disadvantaged 
areas where it’s needed most’.  The facilities lost money when operated by Edinburgh 
Leisure thus, as Findlay-King et al (2017, p.10) remark, ‘the official rhetoric of asset 
transfer could therefore be part of a hegemonic discourse’.  Transfers were not about 
empowering the community, rather about saving money reflective of austerity 
localism.  One facility, in a deprived housing scheme, was initially run by volunteers 
drawn from the working class community who had campaigned for years for a local 
facility.  However it was felt that their business model failed as, while strong on the 
community side, its open and democratic governance arrangements limited access to 
business acumen needed to run a financially sustainable operation.  The absence of 
state or business help in this ‘failure’ is ignored in official discourse. 
 
The facility was taken over by Edinburgh Leisure whose distant and bureaucratic 
structure restricted responsiveness to local needs, with youngsters only entering the 
facility to, as one interviewee commented, ‘use the toilet, annoy the receptionist or 
climb on the roof’ with their provision restricted to ‘a crappy outside kick pitch’.  Its 
replacement with a social enterprise basketball consortium encompassing a club, the 
governing body and a housing association were – mirroring progressive localism - 
passionate about ‘sport for change’ and, in particular, developing young people’s 
resilience.  The procurement process was competitive and reactive, attracting 
volunteers with high levels of social capital.  Central to the consortium’s success was 
creating a welcoming environment in contrast to that delivered by ‘grumpy janitors’ 
in education facilities and low paid sport staff in council venues.  Within the ‘cracks 
and fissures’ of neoliberalism they initiated innovations like a keyholder system for 
trusted clubs, a niche offering of urban sports to compete with Edinburgh Leisure and 
Edinburgh University facilities, and a proposed diversification into shelter 
accommodation for homeless people.  While the latter shows aspects of progressive 
localism they were deemed easier to reach than working class locals on the nearby 
estate. 
 
With limited initial council support there was an inevitable focus on income 
generation from consumers in surrounding affluent communities for financial 
sustainability. This risks accentuating, not challenging, existing inequalities.  The 
offer of business mentoring opportunities to local youngsters – on a reactive basis – 
provided ‘spaces of hope’ predominantly for those from more affluent backgrounds.  
Rather than challenge neoliberalism, some staff mirrored its description of council 
staff as lacking innovation and community orientation.  The need to develop a 
sustainable business meant the organisation – which was managed by just one person 
- was not a forum for critically discussing the requirement for austerity and inequality.  
It is only now – five years after opening – that management seek more progressive 
outcomes.  Evidence for locating the asset transfer within austerity localism can also 
be seen in its uneasy relationship between governance and democracy.  Involving 
locals from the deprived estate could heighten local ownership, however it was felt to 
risk financial sustainability. The facility was championed by the SNP’s Minister for 
Local Government and Community Empowerment as an example of what happens 
when power within the community is unleashed.  However, without a critical 
theorisation of power and community this ignores how affluent groups take advantage 
of progressive opportunities within neoliberalism’s ‘cracks and fissures’ while poorer 
groups cannot (Crisp, 2015). It also ignores how class tensions are played out within 
and outside the facility as local working class youngsters manufacture their definition 
of sport – notably informal activity on the revamped outside kick pitch - while an 
‘unwritten contract’ oversees their facility use.  To encourage progressive class-
mixing there were attempts at negotiating trusted relationships with local youngsters 
by employing staff with local connections. 
 
Focusing on the organisation’s innovative approaches to enhancing community 
resilience and progressive localism deflects from the state’s role in the area’s decline.  
Positivity surrounding community responsibilisation encouraged a focus on 
‘innovation’, ignoring the existence of what Dunleavy et al (2011, p.17) term 
‘destructive innovation’.  As they argue, ‘social enterprises are not real substitutes for 
government and cannot be expected to fill the breach if funding and central support is 
absent or insufficient’.  As Litmus (2010, p.19) comments, reliance on well-meaning 
volunteers ‘carries the potential for patchy provision and stigma, and simply cannot 
provide a guarantee of justice for all’.  While the local state is ‘not always easily 
called to democratic account’ it ‘remains more politically accountable then self-styled 
community groups whose representative character is always questionable’ (Levitas, 
2012, p.11).  This questions the view of Hastings et al (2013 & 2015) that managing 
cuts through innovation, adaptation and entrepreneurship is necessarily positive.         
 
Splashback: Save Leith Waterworld 
While local austerity protests have been marginal they have occurred, with 
resourceful citizens imagining different futures for public services (Bramall, 2016).  
The aforementioned author states that a challenge will be to ‘vividly imagine the 
future of austerity’s casualties’ which includes removing opportunities for young 
people (p.4).  The New Economics Foundation (2015) argue that austerity places 
disadvantaged communities under extreme pressure but, while damaging effects are 
recorded, less emphasis is placed on creative responses from councils, voluntary 
sector and campaigners that ‘imagine alternatives’ to advance social justice.   
 
To Newman (2015), austerity’s fraught context provided ‘hope for something 
different’ and ‘inspired new forms of activism’ painting pictures of what is possible in 
a good society overseen by a politics that ‘encourages attachments’.  As O’Hara 
(2014, p.6) comments, protestors ‘may not have been reaching wide audiences’ or 
matched austerity’s ‘emotionally powered narrative’, ‘but they were 
there….challenging the perceived wisdom of necessary austerity from a  number of 
very important structural fronts’.  While other studies examine large austerity protests 
(Bailey et al, 2015), I examined conflict over a leisure pool that might seem distant 
from austerity politics.  However as Paddison & Sharp (2007, p.87) argue, what 
appear ‘local banal spaces’ enable ‘the encountering of difference’ - however ‘fleeting 
and superficial’ - which is ‘the essence of city life’.  Central to their arguments is 
how, within entrepreneurial cities, ‘democratic practices unfold to threaten, or indeed 
enhance, such local public spaces’ whose central location within ‘everyday urban 
life…once threatened…become sites of resistance’ (p.89). 
 
O’Hara (2014, p.244) argues that key to austerity is ‘the rise of those who have 
refused to be cowed and have been fighting back’, providing a ‘modicum of hope in 
an otherwise bleak political panorama’.  An interesting example of this was a 
campaign to reverse the council’s decision to close Edinburgh’s only leisure pool 
Leith Waterworld (LWW).  Opened in 1992, it was beset with problems with periodic 
closures and threats of permanent closure due to it costing £1500 per day to remain 
open.  After pressure from residents and councillors rescue packages were found in 
1997 and 2005 which left it operating three days a week.  In 2011 the council agreed 
to close the facility with the estimated £1 million capital receipt going towards 
revamping the Royal Commonwealth Pool (RCP) to host the diving competition of 
Glasgow’s 2014 Commonwealth Games.  However campaigners’ thoughts mirrored 
arguments that pool closure protests signified that they had ‘become an important 
democratic public space…embedded within local social life and local mythology’ 
(Paddison & Sharp, 2007, p.102).  Mirroring progressive localism, the campaign was 
strongly linked to the local Leith community.  Campaigners felt the facility provided a 
unique community focal point and criticised Edinburgh Council for abandoning 
LWW when the locality faced significant economic and social problems.  One 
campaigner commented ‘there’s no way I’m having my kids deprived of LWW 
without having a go.  This is Leith.  There is still a vibrant community who care about 
local facilities so we’re in with a chance’.  A local GP felt it was being closed 
‘because it’s Leith and they think no one will complain.  Maybe they thought it would 
be easier than closing a pool in Stockbridge’. Another local argued ‘It feels as though 
the people up the hill have given up on north Edinburgh’ - a view linked to the 
decision not to run the city’s controversial tram network to Leith – ‘there’s now death 
by a thousand little cuts’ (Ross, 2011).  The aforementioned author felt Leith’s 
resentment had deep roots as, while an Edinburgh district, it was originally a distinct 
burgh which feels ‘both jealous of and superior to the city up on the hill’. 
 
While opponents questioned the pool’s progressive credentials – one sport official 
questioned the health value of ‘splashing around’ there – campaigners’ vision was to 
re-open LWW as a community-led social enterprise, revitalised as a pool, family 
leisure destination and inclusive health and well-being hub: the epitome of 
progressive localism. They felt the official’s comment displayed ‘a blasé attitude 
towards well-being which is not about sport, it’s about space and time to share with 
your family’.  A Green candidate believed the pool ‘enables families, people with 
disabilities and others to meet people out-with their everyday connections, 
contributing to community resilience that we need for a sustainable and just future’.  
With approximately one quarter of Leith children living in poverty (Edinburgh 
Council, 2014), a space like LWW was deemed crucial.  Campaigning began in 
November 2011 with petitioning outside LWW using a Swimming Utility Battlebus 
(SUB) as the focal point. Three thousand signatures were collected in the first week, 
rising to six thousand when protestors made a deputation to the council in February 
2012.      
 
Key to stadium disputes is political framing (Reid, 2014).  In their narrative, 
campaigners highlighted people’s lived experiences, notably that LWW was well-
used by local disadvantaged children and by the disabled who benefitted from its 
warm water and gently sloping access which negated a publicly humiliating entry by 
hoist.  A campaigner felt it was not a pool ‘but a play park in water’ with closure a 
‘hammer blow to an economically fragile area like Leith’.  The top-down nature of 
austerity decisions and their psychological impact was highlighted by campaigners 
who stressed that ‘decisions made up in town could take away reasons to come into 
Leith’, reducing opportunities ‘to counter the area’s negative stereotyping’.  One 
described it as ‘the latest battle for a community struggling to save its identity’ with 
the pool deemed a ‘real bonding place’ (Ross, 2011).  While closure supporters 
highlighted the pool’s large subsidy, campaigners described the £300k cost as ‘an 
investment in our community, our children and improving our future…it’s why we 
pay taxes to have public facilities that don’t run on a commercial basis’.  Another 
protestor described the £300k as ‘peanuts compared with the £1billion squandered on 
universally despised trams’.  In response to officials’ claims that locals’ recreational 
needs could be met in other facilities, campaigners formed the Homeless Itinerant 
Bathing Society (HIBS) which visited these pools and found they did not replicate 
LWW.  One campaigner described the RCP as ‘miles away from Leith’ and  ‘does not 
excite our children as it’s just a big rectangular unstimulating pool, while Leith 
Victoria is freezing and full of people doing lengths that give your children evil stares 
for enjoying themselves in the tiny section that allows children’.   
 
The emphasis on numbers in sport facility protests (Sam, 2011) was prevalent with 
campaigners arguing that Edinburgh Leisure deliberately ran-down the facility, with 
maintenance costs falling from £60k per year in 2009/10 to £20k in 2011/12.  Their 
reading of the recovery rate of expenditure against income at 40% - well below the 
84% average - was not that its lack of income threatened its place in the trust’s 
portfolio because ‘it’s a civic amenity not a business and should be considered part of 
a suite of leisure opportunities helped by cross-subsidy.  It is difficult to make money 
off children’.  Campaigners noted the council’s willingness to subsidise the Edinburgh 
International Climbing Arena’s (EICA) annual deficit of £703k – a facility with no 
public transport links – double LWW’s.  The council’s repeated argument concerning 
excessive costs of 14 lifeguards was deemed out-dated, as figures ignored that the 
facility now operated three days a week and was ‘a small price to pay for health’.  
Mirroring criticisms of austerity localism, it was perceived that councillors took 
service reduction decisions based on numbers, not how the facility was a space for 
family and friends from across Edinburgh to ‘share time and happy experiences in a 
relaxed environment’.  While admitting problems with facility design, marketing and 
management, campaigners felt these could be ‘turned around by an administration 
willing to take heed of Leith’s motto: Persevere’.  One Green councillor questioned 
whether, without a masterplan, ‘will the legacy of the Commonwealth Games to Leith 
be its transformation into an anonymous Tesco Town’.     
 
Highlighting concerns about relationships between elite and community sport 
(Collins, 2009), campaigners stressed that the original plan for LWW formed part of 
Edinburgh’s sporting blueprint involving ‘refurbishing the RCP (£7 million over 
budget), selling Meadowbank sport centre (stalled), building a community stadium at 
Sighthill (mothballed) and subsidising the EICA’.  They were deemed elite venues 
developed at the expense of community leisure amenities and - with a markedly 
different political and economic context delivering a much reduced capital receipt 
from LWW’s sale - the closure decision needed revisiting.  One protestor challenged 
the dominant neoliberalism when commenting ‘as a society we need to rethink our 
priorities from the pre-crash culture in 2005 where the name of the game was city 
competition, now the context is recession and its impact on people’s lives’.   With 
Green Party support they argued that the council’s decision was not subject to an 
Equalities Impact Assessment (EIA): a requirement under the trust and Edinburgh 
Council’s partnership and the 2012 Equalities Act.  This, said campaigners, could 
have highlighted whether closure would negatively impact on particular groups, thus 
councillors were not fully informed.  However, by focusing on equalities groups an 
EIA may not have ascertained the closure’s effect on low income individuals who do 
not meet equalities criteria (Asenova et al, 2015).    
 
Like other sport facility disputes (Reid, 2014) protestors’ ability to generate public 
support and media attention meant the issue gained some prominence in the 2012 
local election.  In a hustings meeting a Green candidate described LWW as ‘more 
than a swimming pool it’s a social resource’, while a representative from the Scottish 
Anti Cuts Coalition described closure as ‘a completely unacceptable neoliberal 
decision’.  Campaigners welcomed the ‘heartfelt anger at the physical effects on 
vulnerable individuals of budget decisions made at a distance’.  Without local 
opinions on the closure’s social impact the emphasis on costs was deemed ‘too 
simplistic and misses the opportunity councillors have to turn a loss making venue 
into a profitable one and get people to respect the council more after the trams fiasco’.  
In February 2012 – with local elections only weeks away - Labour, SNP and Liberal 
Democrat councillors backed a Green motion to postpone the facility’s sale for six 
months to give campaigners time to develop a community bid.  Campaigners formed a 
‘Springboard’ group to assess the possibility for community buy-out.  This involved 
the challenge of raising £1 million in six months to buy the pool from the council and 
demonstrate how it could operate on reduced subsidy.  Campaigners described the 
delay as ‘an achievement not a result’ as their preferred vision of progressive localism 
required continued public ownership as, while they would appeal to local skilled 
professionals, the council was part of the community and should be involved.  
Campaigners were heartened by the new Labour / SNP administration’s vision - ‘A 
Contract with the Capital’ - of a co-operative council that would radically alter 
service delivery by ‘facilitating what the community wanted’.  However campaigners 
felt they ‘hit a brick wall’ as councillors and officials were reluctant to provide 
operating costs needed for a credible bid: a claim refuted by officials. 
 
In September 2012 the council rejected the initial bid - involving reduced opening 
hours, revamped soft play and retail offerings, café, improved marketing and more 
community swimming initiatives – giving campaigners until the end of 2013 to 
provide a more commercially sensitive bid.  However, in May 2013 the council sold 
the facility for £1 million to a property group to develop a soft play facility.  An SNP 
councillor felt this delivered a high quality leisure facility for Leith, while the £125k 
allocated towards free swimming for city primary school children was ‘a recognition 
of Splashback’s commitment’.  This ‘infuriated and dismayed’ campaigners who 
believed soft play would not deliver the health and well-being benefits of LWW.  Far 
from the co-operative approach of progressive localism, the Greens felt the council 
reneged on their commitment to examine LWW’s feasibility to the end of 2013, with 
the £125k ‘an attempt to hide the council’s embarrassment…the council has been 
bought and sold for A & G’s gold and pulled the rug from under the community’.  
This sent a ‘terrible message’ to communities that, ‘not only should they plough 
endless amounts of time, energy and money into a project, they must constantly look 
over their shoulder to see if a commercial company will gazump them’.  A Green 
councillor remarked ‘Despite all the warm words of community empowerment and 
people power, when a developer comes along with a wad of cash, community efforts 
count for little’.         
 
However, critics felt that campaigners should not have been given false hope that they 
could operate such a poorly designed facility, accusing the Greens of ‘indulging in the 
seedier side of politics’.  One interviewee felt campaigners ‘were led down the garden 
path when it should have been killed much earlier…we wasted 18 months talking to 
them when they were not competent to run it’.  Another interviewee stressed how 
Glasgow’s Govanhill Pool – held up by Mooney & Fyfe (2006) as an example of the 
community saving a pool threatened by a New Labour council – ‘had, 10 years on, no 
water in it. It’s great that well-meaning amateurs care but for them to run a pool is 
unrealistic’.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper argues that limited devolved powers and broken system of local 
government funding leaves little room for challenging austerity in Scotland.  The 
Scottish Government’s focus on the constitution over inequality and its link to 
disempowering ‘supersized’ councils (Riddoch, 2015 a & b) encourages a focus on 
‘resilient’ councils and communities which, because of that concept’s link to 
‘apolitical ecology’ (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2012), saw cuts in Edinburgh’s sport 
services revolve around income generation, cost savings and further state withdrawal 
(i.e. austerity localism) not socially just progressive localism (Featherstone et al, 
2012).  The campaign to save a leisure pool offered a ‘fleeting glimpse of what anti 
austerity might look like’ (Forkert, 2016, p.26) communicating images of a different 
type of society (Levitas, 2012) that recognised how sport facilities – operating as play 
venues – could bolster community resourcefulness.  Challenging the neoliberal 
hegemony, protestors asked why, in an affluent city, austerity hit the most vulnerable 
and, mirroring O’Hara’s (2014, p.256) point about the value of protests, ‘held a moral 
mirror up to politicians who were the architects of austerity, and those in society who 
remained silent or complicit as injustice grew’.  However, the facility’s initial poor 
design meant it could never deliver progressive localism, with the council’s support 
for community management - later rescinded amidst much acrimony – undermining 
protestors’ belief in local democracy.   
 
With 90% of the council’s services statutory, cuts fell on discretionary areas like sport 
which undermines the government’s preventative spend agenda. Such austerity 
localism (Asenova et al, 2015) was encouraged by sport’s weak legislative 
requirement for ‘adequate’ provision and the trust’s management of regular cuts since 
externalisation.  Rather than evaluations championing successes, trust failures need 
recognised to stimulate debate about how to combine those within councils, trusts and 
social enterprises passionate about using sport for progressive purposes.  Mirroring 
John’s (2014) point about how resilient councils successfully managed austerity, the 
trust may be seen by councillors as part of their ‘outer organisation’ that can be 
diminished without affecting the primary organisation.  While there was relief that 
socially progressive sport and physical activity programmes were maintained through 
obtaining NHS money, there was concern about what would happen when this ended 
and delayed cuts took hold.  There was also concern that losing an experienced sport 
official in a management delayering could hinder their pioneering work around 
physical activity and health.  The predominant austerity localism encouraged the loss 
of less income generating sports development posts and the prioritising of those that 
made money.  Transferring the management of (after hours) school sport facilities to 
the trust was deemed a positive consequence of cuts as it would raise income, reduce 
costs and absorb future cuts.  However, the roll-out of a social enterprise – which is 
more ‘enterprise’ than ‘social’ – facilitates the further ‘roll-back’ neoliberalisation of 
sport services and austerity localism.  It also ignores the potential negative impact on 
one of the council’s asset transfer facilities located next to a school. 
  
In terms of progressive localism the main positive response to cuts was deemed the 
asset transfer of a facility operating on a deprived estate.  To supporters this kept the 
facility open and, aided by an innovative social entrepreneur, delivered significant 
community benefits.  However, while respecting their ability to blend business and 
social objectives, I adopt Levitas’s (2012) ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ towards their 
development of progressive localism.  The council’s emphasis on getting rid of a loss-
making facility led management to prioritise financial concerns and middle class 
needs over those of disadvantaged individuals on the estate.  Exaggerating the ability 
of small, isolated asset transfers to deliver progressive localism and community 
resilience deflects from the state’s withdrawal from promoting socially just sporting 
outcomes throughout the community and city.  It also ignores, in this case, the state’s 
contribution to the area’s decline and the role of Edinburgh Council in addressing 
local problems it created. 
 
With spending cuts prioritising statutory services the concept of progressive localism 
within public sport and leisure services may be a pipedream without adequate 
democratic scrutiny, planning and public participation. The emphasis on citizen 
responsibilisation within resilience discourses deflects from the need for structural 
change to local-central relations that could deliver a western european-style system of 
representative localism (Hildreth, 2011) to empower communities (Mackinnon et al, 
2010). The focus on asset transfer ducks the question ‘what kind of communities and 
social relations we want to create’ (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2012, p.266) and the 
role of the state in this.  With the negative effects of austerity felt most acutely in 
disadvantaged communities (Hastings et al, 2013) it is likely that only communities 
rich in social capital can operate sports facilities that government cannot (Lindsay-
King et al, 2017).  Embracing the concept of ‘resourcefulness’ highlights the 
damaging role of the state and social relations in the evolution of the local, rather than 
take them for granted as in psychology-inspired resilience studies (MacKinnon & 
Derickson, 2012).   
   
The study highlighted many areas for further research.  First, the impact of budget 
cuts on sport and recreation services across Scotland’s 32 councils needs critically 
examined, along with further individual case studies.  Second, how Scottish councils 
have externalised their sport and leisure services to leisure trusts needs assessed in 
relation to critical academic work on social enterprise.  Third it needs assessed 
whether LWW’s closure damaged locals’ ability to withstand socioeconomic 
pressures and whether, like austerity cuts generally (Oxfam, 2013), the burden fell on 
females.  Fourth, analysis is required of local asset transfers to assess whether they are 
mainly prevalent in more affluent communities and whether, in resulting negotiations 
between social classes, they create socially just places for sport.  
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